OAUTH 2.0
SHARED INBOX
Front gives agents authenticated access to your shared inbox: search conversations, reply and comment, manage tags and contacts, and route across inboxes and teammates as the actual user.
import { ScalekitClient } from "@scalekit-sdk/node";
import { createReactAgent } from "@langchain/langgraph/prebuilt";
const sk = new ScalekitClient(env.SCALEKIT_ENV_URL, env.SCALEKIT_CLIENT_ID, env.SCALEKIT_CLIENT_SECRET);
// Front tools scoped to this user
const { tools } = await sk.tools.listScopedTools("user_123", {
filter: { connectionNames: ["front"], toolNames: [
"front_list_tags",
"front_search_conversations",
"front_list_links"] },
pageSize: 100,
});
const agent = createReactAgent({ llm, tools });
await agent.invoke({ messages: [{ role: "user", content: "What is unassigned in the support inbox, and who should take it?" }] });import OpenAI from "openai";
import { ScalekitClient } from "@scalekit-sdk/node";
const sk = new ScalekitClient(env.SCALEKIT_ENV_URL, env.SCALEKIT_CLIENT_ID, env.SCALEKIT_CLIENT_SECRET);
const openai = new OpenAI();
const { tools } = await sk.tools.listScopedTools("user_123", {
filter: { connectionNames: ["front"] }, pageSize: 100,
});
const res = await openai.chat.completions.create({
model: "gpt-5",
messages: [{ role: "user", content: "What is unassigned in the support inbox, and who should take it?" }],
tools,
});
// Execute the tool call with the user's vaulted Front credential
await sk.tools.executeTool(res.choices[0].message.tool_calls[0], "user_123");import Anthropic from "@anthropic-ai/sdk";
import { ScalekitClient } from "@scalekit-sdk/node";
const sk = new ScalekitClient(env.SCALEKIT_ENV_URL, env.SCALEKIT_CLIENT_ID, env.SCALEKIT_CLIENT_SECRET);
const anthropic = new Anthropic();
const { tools } = await sk.tools.listScopedTools("user_123", {
filter: { connectionNames: ["front"] }, pageSize: 100,
});
const msg = await anthropic.messages.create({
model: "claude-sonnet-5",
max_tokens: 1024,
messages: [{ role: "user", content: "What is unassigned in the support inbox, and who should take it?" }],
tools,
});
// Tool call runs with the user's vaulted Front credential
await sk.tools.executeTool(msg.content, "user_123");import { Agent } from "@google/adk/agents";
import { ScalekitClient } from "@scalekit-sdk/node";
const sk = new ScalekitClient(env.SCALEKIT_ENV_URL, env.SCALEKIT_CLIENT_ID, env.SCALEKIT_CLIENT_SECRET);
const { tools } = await sk.tools.listScopedTools("user_123", {
filter: { connectionNames: ["front"] }, pageSize: 100,
});
const agent = new Agent({
name: "front_agent",
model: "gemini-2.5-pro",
instruction: "Manage Front for the signed-in user.",
tools,
});
await agent.run("What is unassigned in the support inbox, and who should take it?");
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// shared token
audit → bot_service_account
// scalekit
audit → user_abc ✓
Does the agent access Front as the user or as a shared key?
As the user. Each workspace member authorizes once and Scalekit resolves their credential at request time. Audit logs attribute every action to that user, not a shared service account.
Where is the Front OAuth token stored?
In Scalekit's managed AES-256 token vault, namespaced per tenant. Refresh is automatic. Revocation is a single dashboard action. Tokens never appear in prompts, logs, or LLM context.
Can I limit what the agent is allowed to do in Front?
Yes. Pass a tool name filter to listScopedTools so the messaging agent only sees the subset you authorize. Pre-API-call scope checks block out-of-policy actions before the request reaches Front.
What happens when a user revokes Front access?
The connection is invalidated on the next tool call. Subsequent requests for that user fail closed with a clear error. Other users in the tenant remain unaffected. The event is logged for audit.
Does the agent respect Front permissions?
Yes. Every call runs as the authorizing user. Native roles, sharing settings, and scope restrictions in Front apply to each request, and actions log to the audit chain.
