OAUTH 2.0
COMMUNICATION
Decisions, blockers, and context move through Slack before they make it anywhere else. Your agent can search messages, read channel history, and surface signals, scoped to the member who authorized it.
For more tools, view docs.
import { ScalekitClient } from "@scalekit-sdk/node";
import { DynamicStructuredTool } from "@langchain/core/tools";
import { createReactAgent } from "@langchain/langgraph/prebuilt";
import { z } from "zod";
const sk = new ScalekitClient(envUrl, clientId, clientSecret);
const { tools } = await sk.tools.listScopedTools("user_123", {
filter: { connectionNames: ["slack"], toolNames: ["slack_channels_list", "slack_channel_history", "slack_messages_send"] },
pageSize: 100,
});
const lcTools = tools.map((t) => new DynamicStructuredTool({
name: t.tool.definition.name,
description: t.tool.definition.description,
schema: z.object({}).passthrough(),
func: async (args) => {
const { data } = await sk.tools.executeTool({
toolName: t.tool.definition.name,
identifier: "user_123",
params: args,
});
return JSON.stringify(data);
},
}));
const agent = createReactAgent({ llm, tools: lcTools });import { ScalekitClient } from "@scalekit-sdk/node";
import OpenAI from "openai";
const sk = new ScalekitClient(envUrl, clientId, clientSecret);
const openai = new OpenAI();
const { tools } = await sk.tools.listScopedTools("user_123", {
filter: { connectionNames: ["slack"], toolNames: ["slack_channels_list", "slack_channel_history", "slack_messages_send"] },
pageSize: 100,
});
// shape tools as OpenAI function definitions
const llmTools = tools.map((t) => ({
type: "function" as const,
function: {
name: t.tool.definition.name,
description: t.tool.definition.description,
parameters: t.tool.definition.input_schema,
},
}));
const resp = await openai.responses.create({
model: "gpt-4o", input: prompt, tools: llmTools,
});import { ScalekitClient } from "@scalekit-sdk/node";
import Anthropic from "@anthropic-ai/sdk";
const sk = new ScalekitClient(envUrl, clientId, clientSecret);
const anthropic = new Anthropic();
const { tools } = await sk.tools.listScopedTools("user_123", {
filter: { connectionNames: ["slack"], toolNames: ["slack_channels_list", "slack_channel_history", "slack_messages_send"] },
pageSize: 100,
});
const llmTools = tools.map((t) => ({
name: t.tool.definition.name,
description: t.tool.definition.description,
input_schema: t.tool.definition.input_schema,
}));
const msg = await anthropic.messages.create({
model: "claude-sonnet-4-6", max_tokens: 1024,
tools: llmTools,
messages: [{ role: "user", content: prompt }],
});import { Agent } from "@google/adk/agents";
import {
MCPToolset, StreamableHTTPConnectionParams,
} from "@google/adk/tools/mcp";
const toolset = new MCPToolset({
connectionParams: new StreamableHTTPConnectionParams({
url: "https://mcp.scalekit.com/slack",
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${userScopedToken}` },
}),
});
const agent = new Agent({
name: "agent", model: "gemini-2.0-flash",
tools: await toolset.getTools(),
});
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// shared bot token
token = "sk_slack_shared_xxx"
audit → bot_service_account
user_filter → broken
// scalekit · per-user
token = resolve(user_id)
audit → user_abc
scope → enforced ✓
Does the agent access Slack as the user or as a shared key?
As the user. Each workspace member authorizes once and Scalekit resolves their credential at request time. Audit logs attribute every action to that user, not a shared service account.
Where is the Slack oauth 2.0 stored?
In Scalekit's managed AES-256 token vault, namespaced per tenant. Refresh is automatic. Revocation is a single dashboard action. Tokens never appear in prompts, logs, or LLM context.
Can I limit what the agent is allowed to do in Slack?
Yes. Pass a tool name filter to listScopedTools so the messaging agent only sees the subset you authorize. Pre-API-call scope checks block out-of-policy actions before the request reaches Slack.
What happens when a user revokes Slack access?
The connection is invalidated on the next tool call. Subsequent requests for that user fail closed with a clear error. Other users in the tenant remain unaffected. The event is logged for audit.
Can the agent post to private channels?
Only if the authorizing user is a member of that channel. Scalekit resolves the user's Slack credential, so private channel posts inherit the user's actual access. No bot membership trick needed.
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