OAUTH 2.0
DEVELOPER TOOLS
Connect to Cloudflare MCP to manage your Cloudflare account — execute API calls, search the OpenAPI spec, and interact with Workers, R2, D1, KV, and all...
from langchain_mcp_adapters.client import MultiServerMCPClient
from scalekit import ScalekitClient
client = ScalekitClient(env_url=ENV_URL, client_id=CLIENT_ID, client_secret=SECRET)
token = client.agent.get_token(user_id="user_id", connector="cloudfaremcp")
mcp = MultiServerMCPClient({
"cloudfaremcp": {
"url": "https://mcp.scalekit.com/cloudfaremcp",
"headers": {"Authorization": "Bearer " + token}
}
})
tools = await mcp.get_tools()import OpenAI from "openai";
import { ScalekitClient } from "@scalekit-sdk/node";
const client = new ScalekitClient({ envUrl, clientId, clientSecret });
const token = await client.agent.getToken({ userId: "user_id", connector: "cloudfaremcp" });
const openai = new OpenAI();
// Connect to MCP at https://mcp.scalekit.com/cloudfaremcp
// Pass: Authorization: Bearer + tokenimport Anthropic from "@anthropic-ai/sdk";
import { ScalekitClient } from "@scalekit-sdk/node";
const client = new ScalekitClient({ envUrl, clientId, clientSecret });
const token = await client.agent.getToken({ userId: "user_id", connector: "cloudfaremcp" });
const anthropic = new Anthropic();
// Connect to MCP at https://mcp.scalekit.com/cloudfaremcp
// Pass: Authorization: Bearer + tokenfrom google.adk.agents import LlmAgent
from scalekit import ScalekitClient
client = ScalekitClient(env_url=ENV_URL, client_id=CLIENT_ID, client_secret=SECRET)
token = client.agent.get_token(user_id="user_id", connector="cloudfaremcp")
# Connect to MCP at https://mcp.scalekit.com/cloudfaremcp
# Pass: Authorization: Bearer + token
Does the agent access Cloudflare as the user or as a shared key?
As the user. Each workspace member authorizes once and Scalekit resolves their credential at request time. Audit logs attribute every action to that user, not a shared service account.
Where is the Cloudflare OAuth token stored?
In Scalekit's managed AES-256 token vault, namespaced per tenant. Refresh is automatic. Revocation is a single dashboard action. Tokens never appear in prompts, logs, or LLM context.
Can I limit what the agent is allowed to do in Cloudflare?
Yes. Pass a tool name filter to listScopedTools so the DevOps agent only sees the subset you authorize. Pre-API-call scope checks block out-of-policy actions before the request reaches Cloudflare.
What happens when a user revokes Cloudflare access?
The connection is invalidated on the next tool call. Subsequent requests for that user fail closed with a clear error. Other users in the tenant remain unaffected. The event is logged for audit.
Can the agent execute any Cloudflare API call?
Only what the authorizing user's Cloudflare account and token scopes allow. The execute tool respects account membership, and Scalekit's pre-call checks let you cap which API families the agent may touch.
