Databricks Workspace

Live

OAUTH 2.0

ANALYTICS

Analytics

Connect to Databricks Workspace APIs using a Service Principal with OAuth 2.0 client credentials to manage clusters, jobs, notebooks, SQL, and more.

  • Acts as the user: Every tool call runs as the authorizing user. Access and audit trail stay intact.
  • Credentials stay vaulted: AES-256 encrypted, resolved at request time, never stored in LLM context.
  • Scoped before every call: Per-user permissions enforced automatically. 90-day audit trail included.
Databricks Workspace
agent · Acme Q3
Run
Cluster Get in Databricks Workspace
S
databricksworkspace_cluster_get
85ms
Databricks Workspace agent
Get details of a specific databricks cluster by cluster id..
Sources: Databricks Workspace
databricksworkspacemcp
1 tool call
18:29
Message Claude...

Databricks Workspace tools for AI agents

CALL ANY TOOL
12 tools covering cluster.
databricksworkspace_job_get
Job get
Get details of a specific Databricks job by job ID.
Parameters
Name
Type
Required
Description
job_id
integer
Required
The unique identifier of the job.
databricksworkspace_dbfs_put
Dbfs put
databricksworkspace_dbfs_list
Dbfs list
databricksworkspace_dbfs_read
Dbfs read
databricksworkspace_jobs_list
Jobs list
databricksworkspace_job_create
Job create
databricksworkspace_job_delete
Job delete
databricksworkspace_repos_list
Repos list
databricksworkspace_secret_put
Secret put
databricksworkspace_cluster_get
Cluster get
databricksworkspace_dbfs_delete
Dbfs delete
databricksworkspace_repo_create
Repo create
databricksworkspace_repo_delete
Repo delete
databricksworkspace_repo_update
Repo update
databricksworkspace_cluster_edit
Cluster edit
databricksworkspace_secrets_list
Secrets list
databricksworkspace_cluster_start
Cluster start
databricksworkspace_clusters_list
Clusters list
databricksworkspace_secret_delete
Secret delete
databricksworkspace_cluster_create
Cluster create
databricksworkspace_cluster_resize
Cluster resize
databricksworkspace_workspace_list
Workspace list
databricksworkspace_cluster_restart
Cluster restart
databricksworkspace_permissions_get
Permissions get
databricksworkspace_workspace_delete
Workspace delete
databricksworkspace_workspace_export
Workspace export
databricksworkspace_cluster_terminate
Cluster terminate
databricksworkspace_workspace_import
Workspace import
databricksworkspace_permissions_update
Permissions update
databricksworkspace_job_run_get
Job run get
Build your Agent
Same auth pattern across every framework.
Python · LlamaIndex
from langchain_mcp_adapters.client import MultiServerMCPClient
from scalekit import ScalekitClient

client = ScalekitClient(env_url=ENV_URL, client_id=CLIENT_ID, client_secret=SECRET)
token = client.agent.get_token(user_id="user_id", connector="databricksworkspace")

mcp = MultiServerMCPClient({
"databricksworkspace": {
"url": "https://mcp.scalekit.com/databricksworkspace",
"headers": {"Authorization": "Bearer " + token}
}
})
tools = await mcp.get_tools()
import OpenAI from "openai";
import { ScalekitClient } from "@scalekit-sdk/node";

const client = new ScalekitClient({ envUrl, clientId, clientSecret });
const token = await client.agent.getToken({ userId: "user_id", connector: "databricksworkspace" });

const openai = new OpenAI();
// Connect to MCP at https://mcp.scalekit.com/databricksworkspace
// Pass: Authorization: Bearer + token
import Anthropic from "@anthropic-ai/sdk";
import { ScalekitClient } from "@scalekit-sdk/node";

const client = new ScalekitClient({ envUrl, clientId, clientSecret });
const token = await client.agent.getToken({ userId: "user_id", connector: "databricksworkspace" });

const anthropic = new Anthropic();
// Connect to MCP at https://mcp.scalekit.com/databricksworkspace
// Pass: Authorization: Bearer + token
from google.adk.agents import LlmAgent
from scalekit import ScalekitClient

client = ScalekitClient(env_url=ENV_URL, client_id=CLIENT_ID, client_secret=SECRET)
token = client.agent.get_token(user_id="user_id", connector="databricksworkspace")
# Connect to MCP at https://mcp.scalekit.com/databricksworkspace
# Pass: Authorization: Bearer + token
Try these prompts
Paste any prompt into your agent to get started.
Get started
Copy the prompt
Copied
List all schemas within a catalog using INFORMATION_SCHEMA.SCHEMATA?
Copy the prompt
Copied
List PRIMARY KEY and FOREIGN KEY constraints for tables in a schema using INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLE_CONSTRAINTS?
Advanced
Copy the prompt
Copied
List all schemas within a Unity Catalog in the Databricks workspace?
Copy the prompt
Copied
Fetch a specific result chunk for a paginated SQL statement result?
SEE HOW AUTH WORKS
User authorises once. Every agent call after uses their token with scope enforcement.
1
Authorize
Your user connects
Databricks Workspace
once. We tie it to their identity and the meetings they approved — no shared bot account, no org-wide access
Who:
user ‘A’
when:
Once per user
access:
Limited to user
2
Store
Their
Databricks Workspace
token lives in a vault scoped to them. User A's meetings are never reachable by an agent acting for user B, even on the same connection
vault:
encrypted
scope:
per-user
tokens:
auto-refreshed
3
Resolve
When your agent calls a
Databricks Workspace
tool, we fetch the right token server-side. It never touches your agent, never appears in the LLM context, never shows up in your logs
speed:
~40ms
check:
before every call
seen by:
nobody
4
Audit
Every
Databricks Workspace
tool call is logged — who triggered it, which meeting was fetched, what came back. 90 days of history, tied to the user who authorized it
history:
90 days
export:
SIEM-ready
logged:
every call
Test other agents
See the same per-user auth pattern across other connectors.
GTM and RevOps Teams
Revenue forecast commentary
Pulls open pipeline from Salesforce and HubSpot, calculates coverage against quota, flags at-risk stages, posts commentary to Slack, and logs every snapshot to Google Sheets.
GTM and RevOps Teams
Deal intelligence agent
Pulls recent Gong calls, scores deal risk with an LLM, cross-references the record in Attio, and DMs each owner their at-risk deals in Slack. Every read is scoped to that rep's own access.
Engineering Teams
Engineering standup agent
Pulls commits from GitHub and GitLab, tracks issue movement in Jira, and posts a per-engineer standup brief to Slack. Each engineer's activity is read on their own delegated OAuth.
GTM and RevOps Teams
Competitive intelligence briefing agent
Scans Gong calls for competitor mentions, matches each one to its Notion battlecard, and DMs every affected rep a single Slack digest per cycle. Every call runs as the PMM who owns the briefing, never a shared bot.
Test other agents
See the same per-user auth pattern across other connectors.
SALES
Deal intelligence agent
Score Gong call risk with an LLM, cross-reference the Attio record, and DM each owner their at-risk deals in Slack.
ENGINEERING
Engineering standup agent
Pull commits from GitHub and GitLab, track Jira issue movement, and post a per-engineer standup brief to Slack.
GTM
Revenue forecast agent
Score pipeline coverage against quota across Salesforce and HubSpot, post forecast commentary to Slack, log snapshots to Sheets.
GTM
Competitive intelligence briefing agent
Scan Gong calls for competitor mentions, match each one to its Notion battlecard, and DM every affected rep a single Slack digest.
Why Scalekit
Secure your agent's access. Connectors ship in minutes
01.
Shared tokens break per-user analytics
A shared token looks fine in a demo. In production every call looks like a service account. Scalekit resolves the real user credential.
// shared token
audit → bot_service_account

// scalekit
audit → user_abc ✓
02.
Authentication is not authorization
03.
Multi-tenancy is architectural
04.
One connector today. Ten tomorrow.
“Our agents act across Salesforce, Gong, Google Drive, and more, on behalf of every customer. Scalekit behind the scenes meant we can keep adding tools without ever rebuilding how credentials or tool calling work.”
Venu Madhav Kattagoni
Head of Engineering / Von
FAQs
Frequently Asked Questions

Does the agent access Databricks Workspace as the user or as a shared key?
As the user. Each workspace member authorizes once and Scalekit resolves their credential at request time. Audit logs attribute every action to that user, not a shared service account.

Where is the Databricks Workspace OAuth token stored?
In Scalekit's managed AES-256 token vault, namespaced per tenant. Refresh is automatic. Revocation is a single dashboard action. Tokens never appear in prompts, logs, or LLM context.

Can I limit what the agent is allowed to do in Databricks Workspace?
Yes. Pass a tool name filter to listScopedTools so the analytics agent only sees the subset you authorize. Pre-API-call scope checks block out-of-policy actions before the request reaches Databricks Workspace.

What happens when a user revokes Databricks Workspace access?
The connection is invalidated on the next tool call. Subsequent requests for that user fail closed with a clear error. Other users in the tenant remain unaffected. The event is logged for audit.

Does the service principal respect Unity Catalog permissions?
Yes. Cluster, job, and SQL calls run under the connected service principal's grants, with Unity Catalog ACLs intact. Scalekit vaults the OAuth credential and scope-checks each tool call on top.

Start in your coding agent
Up and running in one command
Install the Scalekit skill in your editor of choice. Connector, auth, tools, prompt, all wired up
Claude Code REPL
/plugin marketplace add scalekit-inc/claude-code-authstack
/plugin install agentkit@scalekit-auth-stack
Cursor Code REPL
# ~/.cursor/mcp.json
{
""mcpServers"": {
""databricksworkspace"": {
""url"": ""https://mcp.scalekit.com/databricksworkspace"",
""headers"": { ""Authorization"": ""Bearer $SCALEKIT_TOKEN"" }
}
}
}
Codex Code REPL
# ~/.codex/config.toml
[mcp_servers.databricksworkspace]
url = ""https://mcp.scalekit.com/databricksworkspace""
auth_env = ""SCALEKIT_TOKEN""
Copilot Code REPL
# .vscode/mcp.json
{
""servers"": {
""databricksworkspace"": {
""url"": ""https://mcp.scalekit.com/databricksworkspace"",
""type"": ""http""
}
}
}